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dc.contributor.authorRADEV, Yuli
dc.date.accessioned2016-05-19T08:42:12Z
dc.date.available2016-05-19T08:42:12Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1314-3123
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10610/1623
dc.description.abstractThe present publication discusses some of the current issues of long-term contracts that are related to the specification and execution of incomplete contracts. Our attention is focused on the concept of limited rationality along with two related fundamental questions: (1) How is limited rationality modelled?; and (2) Is the assumption of limited rationality consistent with theories that are traditionally based on the postulate of complete rationality?bg_BG
dc.language.isoenbg_BG
dc.publisherАИ "Ценов"bg_BG
dc.relation.ispartofseries1;10
dc.subjectlong-term contractsbg_BG
dc.subjectincomplete contractsbg_BG
dc.subjectlimited rationalitybg_BG
dc.subjecttransaction costsbg_BG
dc.subjectinformation asymmetrybg_BG
dc.titleLONG-TERM CONTRACTS – CURRENT ISSUESbg_BG
dc.typeArticlebg_BG


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