| dc.description.abstract | One of the major characteristics of the so-called ‘analytic Kant scholarship’ is its attempt to use ‘Kantian transcendental argumentation’, broadly construed, while rigorously detaching it from the context of the accompanying transcendental psychology and transcendental idealism in general. On this interpretation ‘Kantian’ transcendental arguments harbour primarily anti-skeptical potential: they can (and should) be taken as an attempt at a definitive refutation of Cartesian skepticism. Allegedly, Kant aims at an ‘internal refutation’ of skepticism, i.e., a refutation using a premise shared by the skeptic, or, in a stronger version, comprising an inalienable part of his/her position. Generally, this key premise is identified with the reality of conscious subjective experience of some kind. Then, the analysis of the possibility of such experience is expected to show that amongst the latter’s conditions of possibility is the existence of external objects (the standard interpretation of the Second edition ‘Refutation of Idealism’), which entails the falsity of the skepticism with regard to external objects. Or, on the analytical view in question, a Kantian transcendental argument is an argument demonstrating that the existence of physical objects of a given sort is a condition of the possibility of even subjective experience. The present paper will discuss the framework and results of the analytical use of the Kantian transcendental strategy. In Parts I - III I will consider Peter Strawson’s reconstruction of the Kantian anti-skeptical argumentation in his Bounds of Sense as well as some recent developments of the Strawsonian strategy. An alternative, and prima facie, more promising position, Anthony Brueckner’s one, will be examined in Parts IV – VI. Parts VII – X will present my proposal for accounting for the failure of the analytical approach exemplified by the two authors and will end with a few general comments on the analytic use of transcendental argumentation. | bg_BG |
