Показване на основна информация на публикация

dc.contributor.authorWysocki, Igor
dc.contributor.authorBlock, Walter
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-16T14:21:35Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-16T14:21:46Z
dc.date.available2017-11-16T14:21:35Z
dc.date.available2017-11-16T14:21:46Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.issn1311-9206
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10610/3359
dc.description.abstractThis paper addresses economic methodology, focusing particularly on Caplan’s (2003) probabilistic analysis and the problems therewith. The argument launched against Caplan is based on the fact that the said author either violates the rule of self-reference (his methodological statement) rule does not obey the standard it sets itself to judge the lower-level propositions of economics) or if it does not, Caplan is inevitably in the epistemic dark as to the probability of lower-level propositions. In the meantime, we will make an attempt at the exegesis of what Caplan may possibly mean by the notion of probability. Finally, it will be demonstrated that the criticism directed at Caplan does not apply to the methodology employed by Austrian economics.us_US
dc.publisherTsenov Publishing Houseen_EN
dc.relation.ispartofseries3;1
dc.subjectMethodologyus_US
dc.subjectprobabilitus_US
dc.subject; Austrian economicsus_US
dc.subjectsynthetic apriorius_US
dc.titleCAPLAN ON PROBABILITY: A CRITIQUEus_US
dc.typeArticleus_US


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Показване на основна информация на публикация