LONG-TERM CONTRACTS – CURRENT ISSUES

dc.contributor.author	RADEV, Yuli
dc.date.accessioned	2016-05-19T08:42:12Z
dc.date.available	2016-05-19T08:42:12Z
dc.date.issued	2012
dc.identifier.issn	1314-3123
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10610/1623
dc.description.abstract	The present publication discusses some of the current issues of long-term contracts that are related to the specification and execution of incomplete contracts. Our attention is focused on the concept of limited rationality along with two related fundamental questions: (1) How is limited rationality modelled?; and (2) Is the assumption of limited rationality consistent with theories that are traditionally based on the postulate of complete rationality?	bg_BG
dc.language.iso	en	bg_BG
dc.publisher	АИ "Ценов"	bg_BG
dc.relation.ispartofseries	1;10
dc.subject	long-term contracts	bg_BG
dc.subject	incomplete contracts	bg_BG
dc.subject	limited rationality	bg_BG
dc.subject	transaction costs	bg_BG
dc.subject	information asymmetry	bg_BG
dc.title	LONG-TERM CONTRACTS – CURRENT ISSUES	bg_BG
dc.type	Article	bg_BG